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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the implementation 
of the Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) in October 1991 
at the Naval Air Weapons Center, Point Mugu and its effects on 
the Naval Air Reserve (NAR). First, the DBOF system and unit 
costing concepts are explained. The focus then shifts to the 
industrial activities of the DBOF at Point Mugu. The effects 
of the DBOF implementation on the business relationship 
between the Aircraft Maintenance Department (AMD) and the NAR 
are analyzed. In particular, the factors used in determining 
output measures for customer billings by the AMD at Point Mugu 
are explored. An identification of the cost drivers causing 
the recent annual cost increases from the maintenance work 
performed on the NAR's aircraft is also made. Problem areas 
associated with the DBOF at Point Mugu and how they effect the 
NAR are discussed. 
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The changing environment resulting from the ending of the 
Cold War era has led the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
initiate a military reassessment called the Bottom-Up Review. 
The Review, completed in September 1993, encompasses all the 
major elements of defense planning. The Review outlines new 
military strategies in force structure, weapons modernization, 
and new defense initiatives as well as plans to carry out 
these strategies. 
The Review calls for a smaller, less expensive,and more 
efficient defense force structure. Because of the high 
priority placed on downsizing military structure and budget, 
the enormous defense support organization is also being 
proportionately re-aligned. Efficient financial management in 
both areas, force operations and force support is critical. 
This thesis will focus on the area of force support. 
With a large share of Navy funds going to support 
industrial operations, managers should be interested in the 
efficiency of these activities. Support activities have a 
direct effect on the Navy's budget. Each dollar spent in the 
support establishment competes with requirements of the 
operating forces. It is therefore imperative that financial 
1 
management in support activities emphasize efficiency and cost 
control to maximize the resources available to the operating 
forces. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has made various efforts 
in the past to improve the financial management system. 
Presently, the financial management for all defense activities 
is in transition. The new DoD strategy is to establish a more 
businesslike buyer-seller approach for recurring DoD 
requirements. The concept adopted expands the use of 
revolving funds. 
A revolving fund uses a working capital fund to finance 
its operations, and can use a number of approaches for 
charging customers, one being a unit cost system. Thi:, cost 
concept takes into consideration the producer's total cost for 
a good or service and transfers the total cost to the unit or 
output produced. This cost is then paid by the customer. The 
unit cost concept has advantages and disadvantages and will be 
discussed later. Combining multiple activities which use 
unit costing and the revolving fund concept within the DoD has 
evolved into what is currently called the Defense Business 
Operations Fund (DBOF) . 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the former 
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) costs incurred at Naval Air Weapons 
2 
Center (NAWC) at Point Mugu by the Naval Air Reserve (NAR) 
squadrons based there. 1 Conunander Naval Air Reserve Force 
( COMNAVAIRESFOR) has requested this study be conducted to 
provide insights on DBOF cost allocation at NAWC Pt. Mugu. 
Escalating costs, particularly in the squadron's maintenance 
area, has raised concerns as to what is driving up the cost. 
The present cost allocation methods will be presented and 
evaluated. Feasible alternative recommendations will also be 
made. 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF STODY 
This thesis will discuss the background and building 
concepts involved in unit costing and revolving funds and 
proceed to focus on the area of industrial activities in the 
DBOF. The underlying goal is to show how the system was 
created and to examine the resulting outcome for one specific 
customer, NAR squadrons. Specifically, this analysis will 
show details of the sources of the DBOF charges and the 
allocation basis used to compute the NAR's fair share as a 
tenant. 
D. BACKGROUND 
The NAR is an Echelon III conunand which currently operates 
15 Echelon IV air conunands. This force structure consists of 
1Although people still refer to Industrial Funds and Stock 
Funds from force of habit, there is technically only DBOF with 
business divisions. 
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six wholly owned reserve Naval Air Stations (NAS's), two Naval 
Air Facilities (NAF' s) and seven NAR commands located at 
active duty NAS's, including NAR Pt. Mugu located at NAWC Pt. 
Mugu. See Table 1. 
Table 1. COMNAVAIRESFOR SQUADRONS BY SITE 
NAR ALAMEDA MAS ATLANTA NAR ~A~KSQNVILLE 
VA-304 A6/KA6 VA-205 A6/KA6 VR-58 C9B 
VR-55 C9B VR-46 DC9 VFA-203 P3B 
VP-91 P3C NAS UC12B VP-62 P3C 
HS-85 SH3H MAG-42 AHlW HS-75 SH3H 
MAG-46A RH53-D MAG-42 OVlOA/D MAG-42A F/Al8 
NAS DALLAS NAS t!§W QR.LEANS NAS gLENVIEW 
NAS A4M CFLSW DET CT39G VR-51 C9B 
VR-59 C9B VR-54 Cl30T VP-60 P3B 
VF-201 Fl4A VP-94 P3B VP-90 P3B 
VF-202 Fl4A NAS UC12B NAS UC12B 
NAS UC12B MAG-42C CT39G MAG-41B KC130T 
MAG-41 CH53D MAG-42C UHIN MAG-418 UHlN 
MAF-41 F/Al8 MAG-42C UC14B 
NAF DETRQII NAR MEMPHIS NAR k'I MUf}* 
VR-62 DC9 VR-60 DC9 VFA-305 YA18 
VP-93 P3B VP-67 P3B HCS-5 HH60H 
NAF UC12B MAG-41A A4/TA4 VP-65 P3C 
NAR NQRfQLK NAS WILLOW gROVE NAS SQ. !s;YMOUTH 
VFC-12 A4/TA4 VR-52 DC9 VP-92 P3C 
VR-56 C9B VP-64 P3B HSL-74 SH2F 
VAW-76 E2C VP-66 P3B NAS UC12B 
HCS-4 HH60H HSL-94 SH2G MAG-49C UHlH 
HM-18 RH53D MAG-49 A4/TAS 
MAG-42B CH46E MAG-498 KC130T 
NAR SAN DIEQO NAF WASHINGTON NAR WHIDBEY ISLAND 
VFC-13 A4/TA4 CFLSW DET C20 VR-61 DC9 
VR-57 C9B CFLSW DET CT39G VAQ-309 EA6B 
VAW-85 E2C VR-48 Cl30T VP-69 P3C 
VF-301 Fl4A VAQ-209 EA6B 
VF-302 F14A VP-68 P3C 
HSL-84 SH2G NAF UC12B 
MAG-46C AHlH MAG-49A CT39G 
MAG-46 CH46E MAG-49A F/A18 
VMFT-401 F5E MAG-49A UC12B 
MAG-46 F/Al8 
NAWC Pt. Mugu is a former NIF funded activity transferred 
to the DBOF effective Oct. 1, 1992. With the conversion to 
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the DBOF, the NAR Command and the three Naval Reserve tenant 
squadrons located at NAWC Pt. Mugu (VP-65, HCS-5, and VA-305) 
should incur DBOF overhead and administrative costs tha~ were 
not previously charged at NAWC Pt. Mugu and are not charged to 
reserve units at other AIRPAC, AIRLANT or CNATRA bases. 
COMNAVAIRESFOR also states this additional funding 
requirement is not supported in the Naval Reserve flight hour 
program budget and is increasing substantially year to year. 
The customer funding required to support the NAR at Pt. Mugu 
has increased from $316k in FY-90 to $628k in FY-93. Since 
there are insufficient funds built into the reserve budget to 
support the DBOF bill, the money comes 'out of the hide' of 
other flight programs. This is the starting point from which 
this thesis will proceed. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: 
1. How are DBOF charges allocated to the NAR squadrons 
at NAWC Pt. Mugu? 
Secondary research questions include: 
1. Do any problem areas exist within the DBOF now? 
2. What are possible alternate allocation bases for the 
DBOF? 




Most research was conducted through personal interviews 
during on-site visits or by telephone. Interviews were 
conducted with personnel from the following organizations: 
NAVCOMPT, COMNAVAIRESFOR, NAWC Pt. Mugu Comptroller office, 
NAR Pt. Mugu Comptroller office, and NAR San Diego Comptroller 
office. 
Research data was obtained from personal interviews, 
professional materials, articles, and previous theses. 
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II. THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
A. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM 
The NAR at Pt. Mugu receives funding for its operations 
through the annual appropriations for Operations and 
Maintenance, Navy Reserve appropriation. This funding is a 
result of a complicated budgeting system known as the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
"The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System can be 
summarized in a few words. Based on the anticipated Threat, 
a Strategy is developed. Requirements of the strategy are 
then estimated and Programs are developed to package and 
execute the strategy. Finally the costs of approved programs 
are Budgeted." (Practical Comptrollership, 1993, p.C-11) 
The intent of this discussion is not to go into the 
details of the PPBS. The desired outcome is to establish how 
COMNAVRESFOR funding levels are developed and to identify 
changes that might improve the process. 
The PPBS has three distinct phases; Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting. 2 The following is a summary of these phases: 
• Planning 
-Identify and assess the threat to the United States 
-Develop strategy necessary to meet national objectives 
2Summarized from the article by Lt Col Mel Stinnet, "The A-B-
es of PPBS," The Greener Side of Air Force Blue, vol 5, Air Cormnand 
and Staff College, 1986. Updated by Captain T. H. Hovik. 
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-Determine forces required for the strategy 
-Outcome, National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) 
-Outcome, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
• Programming 
-Translates DPG into a financial plan of effective and 
achievable programs 
-Balance fiscal and resource constraints 
-Outcome, Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 
-Outcome, Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) 
-Outcome, Resource Allocation Display (RAD) 
• Budgeting 
-Planning and Programming translated into annual funding 
requirements 
-Emphasis on first 2 years of POM 
-Executability and pricing of programs 
-Outcome, Program Budget Decisions (PBD) 
-Outcome, Defense Management Review Decisions(DMRD) 
-Outcome, Service budgets/DoD budget 
-Outcome, President's budget 
With the submission of the President's budget to Congress 
the next cycle called Budget Enactment begins. The objective 
of Budget Enactment is to authorize programs and appropriate 
funds. 
B. APPROPRIATION 
Government operations are funded by the Congress by means 
of annual legislation known as Appropriation Acts. Each 
Appropriation Act is normally preceded by an Authorization 
Act. It is the Authorization Act that identifies and 
authorizes the purposes of funds within each appropriation 
account. 
The DoD Appropriation is one of the 13 government 
appropriations. The appropriation accounts that are important 
to this research and referenced in later chapters are: 
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• Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve (O&M,NR) 
• Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDT&E,N) 
• Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) 
• Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) 
The appropriation that covers funding for the NAR 
Squadrons at NAWC Pt Mugu is the Operation and Maintenance, 
Navy Reserve (O&M, NR) . Figure 1 shows the appropriation 















C. OPERATION AND MAINTBNANCB, NAVY RBSBRVB 
1. Appropriation Description 
O&M, NR is an annual appropriation, established by the 
Congress in 1973, available for incurring obligations for 
expense items during the fiscal year specified in the 
appropriation act. This appropriation provides for 
operating the Naval Reserve forces and maintaining their 
equipment at a state of readiness which will permit rapid 
deployment in the event of a full or partial mobilization. 
(COMNAVRESFOR P7100.1A, 1988, p.IV-1-1) 
O&M, NR provides the day-to-day operations and 
maintenance funds for such varied costs as flight operations, 
ship and aircraft depot level maintenance, and base operations 
support costs. In execution funds are distributed to numerous 
major claimants, with the largest percentage allocated to 
COMNAVRESFOR. It is important to note that the O&M, NR 
appropriation includes maintenance and base operations support 
activities. That point will be ref erred to many times in 
later discussions. 
2. Budget Activities 
The O&M,NR appropriation is sub-divided into three 
Budget Activities (BAB} : 
1. BA-1 Mission Forces 
2. BA-2 Depot Maintenance 
3. BA-3 Other Support 
COMNAVRESFOR has funding responsibilities in BA-1 and 
BA-3 for both air and surface force requirements for the 
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activities under its cognizance. BA-2 is executed in total by 
other major claimants. Funding for air forces is passed by 
COMNAVRESFOR to COMNAVAIRESFOR to administer. 
BA-1 for air forces supports flight training, aircraft 
operations and aircraft maintenance. Funds provide for 
fuel, oil, lubricants, consumable and depot level repair 
parts, replacement of flight clothing and emergency 
equipment, active duty military mission travel, 
miscellaneous supplies for squadron operation, and 
operations of simulators and instrumented ranges used for 
crew training. These costs are budgeted as Activity Group 
SA. 
BA- 3 supports other base operations for both air and 
surface conunands. This inLludes the following types of 
cost: administration of all conunand departments, 
maintenance and repair of real property, utilities, 
communications, galley and bachelor quarters operations, 
automatic data processing, travel, minor and plant 
property equipment, civilian labor, transportation 
equipment operation and maintenance, airfield operations, 
recruiting, advertising, and management headquarters. 
These costs are budgeted as the following Activity Groups: 
F3 Other Base Operations Support3 ; F4, Real Property 
Maintenance; ST, Management Headquarters; SY, Recruiting; 
SZ, Advertising. (COMNAVRESFOR P7100.1A, 1988, P.IV-1-2) 
D. ANNOAL PLANNING PIGURB 
An Annual Planning Figure (APF) represents the total 
funding a conunand may plan to receive for the fiscal year 
within its operating budget. An Operating Budget {OB) for 
COMNAVRESFOR conunands is composed of funding for BA-1 and BA-3 
operations. Separate APF's are issued for each BA within the 
3Activity Group F3, Other Base Operations Support, includes 
support to the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department. This 
is referred to later in Chapter 5. 
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OB. APF' s may be issued by COMNAVRESFOR either before or 
after the beginning of the fiscal year, depending on many 
variables such as the nature of the BA and the status of the 
appropriation act. 
OB holders are responsible to ensure that a viable 
financial plan, not dependent on additional funding from 
COMNAVRESFOR, is maintained within their assigned APFs. This 
is where the NAR at Pt. Mugu has been running into problems 
because of escalating labor costs. 
B. BA-1 PLIGHT PROGRAM BXBCOTION 
BA-1 flight funds are used in support of the NAR flight 
hour program. Prior to the beginning of each fiscal year and 
quarterly thereafter, a flight hour program message is sent by 
COMNAVRESFOR to all OB holders. These messages provide 
planned hours as well as cost per hour data for each squadron. 
Non-flight planning figures are also provided. Category cost 
data established by the Annual Flight Program Cost Data 
letters are only guides as to how flight hour coE ·· should be 
apportioned. Movement of funds within these categories is 
encouraged to ensure maximum use of each flight hour dollar. 
Conunanding Off ice rs have the latitude to reprogram flight hour 
dollars from one unit to another provided the reprogranuning 
does not curtail a unit's ability to achieve its annual flight 
hour program. 
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P. AVIATION MAIHTBHAHCB DBPARTMBHT 
Work performed at Aviation Maintenance Department at Pt. 
Mugu is where the DBOF labor charges in question originate. 
AMO repairs broken or darnag:d equipment owned by the NAR 
Squadrons. The AMO is divided into work centers such as 
airframes, avionics, etc. The work center will be broken down 
into more detail later when labor cost is evaluated. As a 
precursor to proceeding to an analysis of labor cost, the 
next chapters will provide background information on unit 
costing and the DBOF. 
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III. TBB UNIT COST CONCEPT 
A. PRINCIPLES 
Unit cost is a foundation upon which the revolving fund 
concept can operate. The principle objective of unit costing 
is to give managers the ability to determine and evaluate all 
the business costs of producing an output. 
First, an output must be identified to be able to assign 
costs. The unit cost system emphasizes using an objective 
measurement of the output by relating it directly to the 
primary mission of the activity. Although this system 
emphasizes a measurable output, it also recognizes that some 
outputs cannot be easily measured and must be treated as a 
level of effort. 
The cost of every product or service output consists of 
direct, indirect, and general and administrative overhead 
costs. Direct costs are those that are cle~rly associated 
with a product or output such as parts or labor hours. 
Indirect costs, such as shop supervisors, benefit two or more 
but not all of the products. General and administrative 
expenses are overhead costs that cannot readily be associated 
to any particular output and are allocated to all outputs or 
products (e.g., base security and fire protection). 
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All costs required to make a product or give a service are 
totaled and then divided by workload units produced to 
determine actual unit cost or cost per output. With this 
approach, all direct cost of production and costs associated 
with the infrastructure that supports an activity are 
accounted for in the unit cost. The objective is to highlight 
the cost drivers, or those activities that result in costs 
being incurred. Cost drivers are then evaluated to determine 
whether they add value to an output or result in improved 
customer support. Activities should strive to eliminate or 
minimize those cost drivers that do not accomplish these 
objectives. 
Customer demand is the factor that determines output 
quantity. The DoD Comptroller sets the unit cost targets at 
the service level based on recommendations of the Military 
Departments. The manager's primary function is to ensure that 
the DBOF activity provides goods and services at or below the 
stipulated unit cost. This ties funding levels directly to 
outputs. Instead of a guaranteed budget level, obligations 
are limited to a predetermined unit cost target times a 
defined output. 
Unit costing is based on the relationship of resources 
consumed to output produced. The system seeks to have each 
product or output bear the cost as accurately as possible. 
Savings can only happen if processes are changed or eliminated 
15 
and the effects of these changes results in a lower actual 
cost per output. 
Unit costing can apply to any support activity within DoD 
regardless of the means of funding (direct appropriations, 
reimbursements, or revolving funds) . 4 Some Navy support 
activities come under unit costing without the transfer 
pricing arrangements afforded by the DBOF. The DoD continues 
to identify activities to be included in the DBOF with a unit 
cost pricing base for customer activity. 
B. ADVANTAGES 
• Producers using unit cost can benefit by minimizing their 
costs after evaluating and adjusting cost drivers, thereby 
improving efficiency in operations. 
• Consumers, who will pay higher prices for fully priced 
goods, will economize by buying only essentials or will 
seek alternate sources offering services at a lower price. 
• Budget evaluation, support and planning will become 
simpler and more consistent. Similar ferf ormance measures 
will apply to diverse organizations. 
• Personnel performance evaluations will be more meaningful 
because of standardized cost methods and comparability 
among similar organizations of the different services. 
• Decision makers in consuming and producing activities will 
know the full cost of resources they consume and can make 
intelligent decisions that integrate cost as an important 
consideration. Managers can more easily assess the 
4Hough, G.H., "Are all costs variable?," Armed Forces 
Comptroller, Winter 1993, p. 15. 
5Seidon, N.E., The DOD Unit Cost Initiative; A NaVY Overview. 
Economic Analysis. And Review Of Base Operations Support Cost 
Allocation, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
December 1991, p. 30. 
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impacts of important decisions and unit cost information 
will provide additional data on which to base decisions 
such as base closures and realignments. 
C. DISADVANTAGES 
• Unit cost pricing may make costs higher than commercial 
alternatives. This can happen because commercial 
activities operate on a contribution margin, not on full 
unit cost basis. As long as commercial activities receive 
more money than their variable costs they will usually 
produce a product or service. 
• Unit cost resourcing also requires a complex accounting 
system to be in place in order to work. The possibilities 
for inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated information used 
to determine unit cost is a great concern. Proper 
customer reimbursement to the working capital fund, as 
well as billing, rely on a good accounting system. 
Accounting standardization in the system is a must. 
• Unit costing fails to distinguish between fixed and 
variable costs. 6 The system tends to imply all the costs 
are variable. For organizations with a high percentage of 
fixed costs significant changes in volume rather than 
managerial decisions will have the greatest impact on unit 
costs. Efforts are underway to try and resolve this 
problem. 
6Hough, G.H., "Are All Costs Variable?," Armed Forces 
Comptroller, Winter 1993, p. 16. 
17 
IV. TBB DBPBN'SB BUSINESS OPERATIONS PUND 
A. HISTORY 
Revolving fund authority is provided by the National 
Security Act cf 1947, as amended (Title 10 U.S.C. section 
2208) which allows the Secretary of Defense to establish 
revolving funds. (Financial Ma.nagement Ma.nual, 1993, p. 9-1) 
Stock and industrial funds originally made up the first 
DoD revolving funds. Stock funds were used to finance the 
purchasing of large inventories of consumables and parts for 
DoD Stock points. These supplies are later repurchased by the 
DoD customer and the stock fund is reimbursed with customer 
funds. Industrial funds provide capital to activities for the 
production of commercial goods and services. DoD customer's 
purchase the products or services and reimburse the industrial 
fund. Different types of services are provided by industrial 
funded activities. Research and Development is one of these 
services and is the primary business activity of NAWC Pt. 
Mugu. 
Overhead costs have always been included in the pricing of 
industrial activity works while supply activity overhead was 
not originally charged to the customer. This policy changed 
on October 1, 1991 when the DBOF was created. This change was 
made in recognition of the fact that the selling prices to 
18 
customers of the revolving funds should include all the costs 
of providing material or industrial goods and services. 
The DBOF originally combined 5 industrial funds and 4 
stock funds into a single revolving fund. The desired 
benefits of using revolving funds are listed below as 
summarized in the DoD publication, DBOF FY 1994 Budget 
Estimates Executive Overview. They are: 
• Improved cost awareness. 
• Businesslike management. 
• Better coordination of operating and fiscal 
responsibilities 
• Buyer-Seller relationships. 
• Easier comparison of similar Service activities. 
• Protection of customers from price increases during 
execution 
• Closer relationships of missions and budgets. 
Improved cost awareness by the producer as well as the 
customer using revolving funds has its benefits to both 
parties. By providing the manager total cost information and 
the authority and flexibility to make tradeoff decisions, 
quality products and services at lowest cost should result. 
For the customer, reduced production costs translate to 
reduced prices. This enablE:.d the customer to more effec1..ively 
accomplish assigned missions within available resources. 
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B. CONCBPT 
The DBOF combines individual revolving funds into a single 
revolving working capital fund. This initial capital funding 
was started by Congress with a funding corpus. When a 
customer needs a service performed he submits a customer order 
to the activity to perform the service. The activity finances 
the cost of the material, personnel, and any other costs to 
start the work. The customer is billed when the work is 
completed or as it is being completed. The customer then pays 
his bill by reimbursing the working capital fund. Prices for 
goods and services produced in a Component business area 
remain the responsibility of that Component and are set on a 
break-even basis over the long term. (DBOF Implementation 
Plan, 1993, p. 5) Billings are based on stabilized rates. 
Stabilized rates are established for the fiscal year based on 
unit cost and the solvency of the activities revolving funds. 
This can result in a directed profit or loss to drive the 
activities Accumulated Operating Result towards a balanced 
position. Profits, when they occur, are returned to customers 
through lower rates in subsequent years, while losses are 
recouped through increased rates in subsequent years. 
Annual budget documents for each business in the Fund 
provide clear guidance as to what the Department's expectation 
of performance should be. Full operational costs to run the 
business are easier to determine, providing valuable 
information for management's use in becoming more efficient. 
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DBOF financial procedures provide increased management 
flexibility to act on areas needing improvement. 
Each business area receives both an operating and a 
capital budget. Major efforts have been taken in each 
business area to improve the delineation between capital 
investments and operating costs. The assets of the industrial 
and stock funds have been transferred to the DBOF. 
Accountability of these assets is in accordance with current 
DoD regulations. All capital assets used by Fund activities 
will be depreciated or amortized in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting standards. (Financial Management Manual, 
1993, p. 9-2) These actions help provide more meaningful 
identification of operation and capital costs and identifies 
total cost of the business area. 
Overall resource utilization is ultimately determined by 
the level of customers orders. The business manager is 
expected to keep costs within the sum of approved cost goals 
times the customer determined work load. This management 
concept provides the manager the opportunity to make trade-off 
decisions for the best operating results within the business. 
C. COST GOALS 
Industrial activities cost goals are now provided through 
a funding document. All funding authority prior to FY 1992 
was provided through customer orders. (Financial Management 
Manual, 1993, p. 9-1) Official management cost goals are 
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issued to the Services and Agencies through Annual Operating 
Budgets (AOBs) . The type of goal depends on the nature of the 
business. 
Some unit cost goals are established at the Departmental 
level; some activities have so many outputs that the goals 
are expressed in terms of the change in cost from the 
prior year; other activities have goals expressed in terms 
of cost per billable hour. (DBOF FY 1994 Budget Estimates 
Cox:porate Overview Operation Budgets, 1993, p.3) 
This area will be covered in more detail later in the 
analysis of NAWC Pt. Mugu's AOB. The result of issuing the 
AOB establishes a cost goal that management needs to strive to 
attain. 
D. MEASURES OP COST 
One of DBOF's primary goals is to breakout cost drivers so 
managers are better aware of what really makes up a product or 
service cost. For managers to be able to reduce cost, there 
must be established credible standard measures of cost. For 
a number of activities, cost per output measures have been 
established which cover a large portion of the work of those 
activities. For others, the establishment of high level goals 
and fixed prices makes it possible to measure changes in cost 
on the basis of financial operating results. Some examples of 
unit cost measures that have been established are: 
• Finance and Accounting service 
- Civilians paid 
- Military paid 
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- Retirees paid 
- Contract invoices paid 
• Distribution Depots 
- Line items shipped 
• Supply Management 
- Sales 
• Depot Maintenance 
- Operating results based on cost goals/fixed prices 
• Commissaries 
- Sales 
• Military Airlift Command 
- Air crews trained 
• Research and Development Labs 
- Billable hour7 
E. POLICIES 
A major change in policy under DBOF is the full recovery 
of losses or return of gains to the customer on an annual 
basis. Previous stock and industrial fund operations were 
expected to break even over the long term. Now, all business 
in the Fund are required to set their prices based upon full 
cost recovery the next year. (DBOF FY 1994 Budget Estimates 
Co:i;:porate Overview Operating Budgets, 1993, p. 16) 
P. THE NAVY AND THE DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND 
The Department of the Navy is the largest of the Military 
Department segments of the DBOF. NAWC Pt. Mugu falls in the 
business area division of Research and Development. 
7DBOF Implementation Plan, 1993, pgs. 31-32. 
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Presently, there are a total of 11 different business areas 
covering eighty major activities. These include: 
• Supply Operations 
- 3 Inventory control points 
- 3 Supply depots 
- 7 Logistic support activities 
• Depot Maintenance 
- 8 Shipyards 
- 6 Aviation depots 
- s Weapons stations 
- 2 Marine Corps depots 
• Research and Development 
- 19 laboratories 
• Transportation 
- Special mission ships 
- Navy Fleet Auxiliary Force 
- All common user transportation functions 
• Base Support 
- 11 Public works centers 
- Naval Academy Laundry Services 
• Information Services 
- 10 Computer and telecommunications stations 
- 8 Consolidated data processing installations 
• Defense Printing Service 
- Consolidated organization for printing and duplications 
G. RBSBARCH AND DBVBLOPllBNT 
On April 12, 1991, tb.! Secretary of the Navy approved a 
plan to consolidate Navy research, development, test and 
evaluation, engineering, and fleet support activities 
effective January 1, 1992 in accordance with Defense 
Management Report Decision (DMRD) 922. (DBOF FY 1994 Budget 
soon Implementation Plan, 1993, pgs. 7-9. 
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Estimates Cor.porate Overview Operating Budgets, 1993, p. 91) 
The objectives of the consolidation and realigrunent were to: 
• Preserve the Navy's Research and Development capability 
with fewer resources 
• Purify mission responsibilities 
• Establish research and development leadership areas 
The consolidation established four Warfare Research 
Centers. They consist of Naval Air Warfare Centers, Naval 
Surface Warfare Centers, Naval Undersea Warfare Centers, and 
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Centers. Point 
Mugu falls under the Naval Air Warfare Centers (NAWC) . The 
NAWC is divided into two types of divisions, Aircraft and 
Weapons. Point Mugu is part of the Weapons Division. 
1. Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu 
Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) provides full spectrum 
research, development, test and evaluation, engineering, and 
fleet support for air platforms, autonomous air vehicles, 
missiles and missile subsystems, weapon systems associated 
with air warfare, avionics systems, and for sensor systems 
used to conduct anti-submarine warfare from air platforms. 
(DBOF FY 1994 Budget Estimate, 1993, p. 190) 
The NAR squadrons located at NAWC Weapons Division 
(NAWCWPNs), Pt. Mugu are considered tenants. The mission of 
the base is quite different than the mission of the NAR. The 
NAR mission is to train Reservists to an operational readiness 
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level to fully man and support an operational squadron capable 
of augmenting the Navy when the need arises. 
Since NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu is a host, the NAR relies on 
the usage of its facilities. The Aircraft Maintenance 
Department is one of the most important facilities the NAR 
uses. An analysis of the cost the NAR incurs at AMO will be 
the focus of discussion in the next chapter. 
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V. COST ANALYSIS OP THE NAVAL AIR RESERVE, POINT MUGU 
A. DBOP CBARGBS POR REPAIRS 
The major goal of this thesis is to analyze the DBOF 
charges NAR squadrons receive from the Aircraft Maintenance 
Department (AMD) at NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu. These costs are for 
completed repair work done on the squadrons' aircraft and 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE). As stated earlier, 
maintenance costs for NAR squadrons have been rising steadily 
since 1990, growing 24% between FY-91 and FY-92, and 64% 
between FY-92 and FY-93. See Figure 2. FY target cost, the 
amount budgeted for maintenance is compared with FY final 
obligation, the ultimate cost. The FY balance, or delta, 
represents the funding the NAR Comptroller had to take from 
other sources to cover the increased maintenance cost. These 
escalating costs raise a variety of questions. What are the 
cost drivers for the rising costs? What is the allocation 
method used for G&A costs and is it fair? Will the costs 
continue to grow at a rapid rate? All are questions to which 
COMNAVAIRESFOR wants answers. 
COMNAVAIRESFOR believes a major factor for the escalating 
costs originated with NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu transferring to the 
DBOF. As described in Chapter IV, a DBOF activity (such as 
the AMD) is reimbursed for their costs by the customer. The 
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DBOF activities charge not only for their direct costs, but 
also for a share of their production and G&A overhead costs. 
Prior to the DBOF, the NAR squadrons were charged only for 
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) labor and parts for work performed 
at AMO. When NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu transferred to the DBOF on 
October l, 1991, COMNAVAIRESFOR assumed part of the 
corresponding rise in costs (24% between FY-91 and FY-92) was 
tied to the indirect costs being added to the former NIF labor 
bill. The new G&A costs, however, did not provide a complete 
answer; it seemed likely that other factors were also 
contributing to the 24% increase.· 
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B. PONDING CONPLICTS 
The NAR squadrons located at Pt. Mugu are not funded for 
such large DBOF charges because they and other NARs are not 
funded for work to be accomplished by DBOF activities. NAR 
squadrons fall under the appropriation system described in 
chapter II. Normally, COMNAVRESFOR transfers funding from the 
O&M,NR appropriation to Naval Air Bases supporting Reserve 
units. Funding is from BA-3 (Base Operations Support) ct:~J is 
used for maintenance support of the NAR squadrons. As an 
example, the NAR squadrons at NAS North Island, San Diego, 
have their repair work performed at the Aircraft Intermediate 
Maintenance Department (AIMD) . These squadrons are nQt. 
charged for the maintenance work performed. NAS North Island 
receives funds from O&M,NR, BA-3, part of which covers the 
AIMD support of the NAR squadrons. However, since the AMD at 
NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu is a DBOF activity operating on customer 
reimbursements for service, funding is passed through the 
squadrons as the customer of the AMD. 
This funding process only occurs for the NAR squadrons 
located at NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu, where DBOF charges are 
depleting the squadrons' resources. The NAR's Comptroller 
controls funding under Activity Group Sa (Air Forces) . The 
SAGs under Activity Groups Sa are listed below: 
• BG Aircraft Fuel, Oil, and Lubricants 
• BU Other Aircraft OPS (other flight operations, 
maintenance, parts, AVDLR's, etc.) 
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• CC Air TAD (travel) 
• CE Other Flight Support (ranges, targets, non-flight 
costs, miscellaneous, cold weather gear, NIP/DBOP, 
etc.) 
• CM Aircraft Simulators 
• EK Air Staffs 
• HZ Intelligence 
The NAR's DBOF costs are first paid from SAG CE, Other 
Flight Support. Because of the steep increases in the DBOF 
costs over the past few years, SAG CE funds have been 
consistently exhausted early in the fiscal year, causing the 
Comptroller to transfer funds from other SAGs in order to 
handle these unexpected big increases. The transferring of 
funds however, provides only a temporary solution and in the 
long run is detrimental to the flight program (the NAR' s 
mission is to adequately support the flight program) . 
Transferring funds, for instance, from the two largest SAGs, 
BG and BU, whose funds are earmarked for the squadrons' 
required flight hours, would seriously endanger readiness. To 
avoid this, the NAR Comptroller has had to, and continues to, 
ask COMNAVAIRESFOR for relief. 
C. JOB COST ACCOtJNTING SYSTBM 
The AMD at Pt. Mugu performs repair work on NAR's aircraft 
and ground support equipment (GSE). A breakdown of the AMD by 

























To start the process, one of Pt. Mugu's squadrons submits 
a work request to the AMD. Once the proper work center 
receives the request it sets up a cost record account called 
a job order. The job order is a document on which the work 
center records all charges necessary to complete the job. 
All costs that accumulate on the job order consist of 
direct and indirect costs. A direct cost includes direct 
labor hours, materials used, and all other costs which are 
directly related to the job. The AMD divides labor into the 
following four general categories: 
• Maintenance Support (aircraft) 
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• GSE NAWCWPNs ASSET 
e GSE TENANT ASSET 
e GSE MISUSE/ABUSE 
Labor hours from the four categories were totaled for 
purposes of this thesis. Indirect costs consist of both 
production (shop supervisors) and general and administrative 
(G&A) costs from the various work centers. These were also 
totaled from the job orders. 
The AMD's job orders are billed by multiplying the total 
time of direct labor hours required for the job by a 
"stabilized rate". The stabilized rate consists of: 
• Labor; 
• Production; and 
• General and Administrative rates. 
For example, the total cost for a job that takes 2 hours 
direct labor to complete = 2 x (stabilized labor rate) + 2 x 
(stabilized production rate) + 2 x (stabilized G&A rate) . How 
the stabilized rates for labor, production and G&A are 
determined is discussed next. 
D. STABILIZATION RATES 
First, two terms, "work year" and "productive hours", 
conunonly used in labor discussions, must be defined. A work 
year consists of 1750 productive work hours. A work year is 
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computed from a worker's salary based over an average year 
containing 2080 total paid hours, including holidays. The 
amount of time per year a worker is due for annual leave, sick 
leave, and holidays average about 330 hours per year. The 
difference b~tween these hours results in 1750 hours, which is 
termed "productive hours". Productive hours can be considered 
the total amount of hours actually worked in a year. Each 
year the AMO and all the other cost centers at NAWCWPNs, Pt. 
Mugu, submit a budget which has their projected stabilized 
rates which would enable them to cover their costs. Since the 
stabilized rates are charged to the customer based on the 
number of direct labor hours to complete a job, an hourly 
figure is determined. Figures from the AMO FY-93 budget will 
be used to show how the stabilization rates are calculated. 
The cost center starts the process by estimating the 
amount of time and work load for the budgeted year. The AMO 
estimated that they would complete 109.7 work years of direct 
labor, a 9.8% increase over FY-92. 
from historical data and future 
This figure is estimated 
expected projects. To 
translate AMO's work years into total productive labor hours 
for FY-93, multi ply 109. 7 (work years) x 1 750 (productive 
hours) = 191,975 hours. The AMO also estimates how much the 
productive labor hours are going to cost. This figure takes 
into account the range of workers' salaries in the different 
work centers. For FY-93 they estimated the cost to be 
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$4,558,600. To determine the stabilized rate for FY-93, the 
AMO divided the estimated cost by the estimated total hours: 
$4.558.600 = $23.75 (direct labor rate) 
191,975 
Basically, the AMO uses the same process to determine the 
stabilized production rate and stabilized G&A rate. The sum 
of these rates is the total stabilization rate that should 
have been charged for any work AMD performed in FY-93. 
All of the cost centers at NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu, perform the 
same computations discussed above. These figures are then 
totaled and averaged by the comptroller for the whole WPNs 
Division. Table 2 shows the stabilization estimates of the 
NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu comptroller for FY-93. 
Table 2 
NAWC POINT MUGU RATE STABILIZATION BUDGET ESTIMATES 
FOR FY-93 ($0001 
ADDED/ TOTAL DIRECT ADDED/ CALC 
TOTAL EXCLUD RATED LABOR I EXCLUD NET AVER 
COSTS COSTS COSTS HOURS HOURS HOURS RATE 
DIRECT 127,831 117,460) 110,371 3,921,328 1727,0021 3, 194,326 $34.55 
PROD 1,358 34,785 36, 143 3,921,328 11.319,1061 2,602.222 $13.89 
G&A 95,068 128,9231 66, 145 3,921,328 (1,319,1061 2,602.222 $25.42 
These rates are then submitted in the annual budget which 
are reviewed and revised by NAVAIR, NAVCOMPT, and OSD before 
being submitted in the President's budget. These rates can be 
adjusted anywhere along the process. The Pt. Mugu FY-93 
budget submission was started in May 1991 with submission to 
NAVAIR in support of FY-93 which started on October 1, 1992. 
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The stabilized rates that resulted from the above process 
for FY-93 are shown in Table 3. Note that the NAWCWPNs, Pt. 
Mugu Comptroller has broken down the total average stabilized 
rates by work center. The AMO direct labor rate shown is 
$27 .13 as compared to $23. 75 computed above. Differences will 
occur from adjustments made in the budget submission process. 
One factor which made a large adjustment in FY-93 was the 
attempted partial recovery of Accumulating Operating Results 
(AORs) losses. AORs are discussed later in this chapter. 
Looking at Table 3, the column containing the labor rate 
discussed above is labeled accelerated direct labor rate. 
This is different than a pure direct labor rate. What 
accelerated direct labor rate means is discussed in the 
following section. 
E. LABOR. ACCELERATION 
All activities at Pt. Mugu charge an accelerated direct 
labor rate. Acceleration is a percentage added to civilian 
and military labor costs to compensate for leave and the 
government's share of the cost of fringe benefits. The total 
cost of a laborer's salary is based on this acceleration rate. 
As stated earlier, a worker's total productive hours are 
considerably less than his yearly total paid hours (1750 hours 
versus 2080 hours) . The DBOF needs to recover all costs of a 
worker's salary, including the cost of fringe benefits. If 
the AMD charged rates based on a worker's total paid hourly 
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Table 3 
NAVAL AIR WARFARE WEAPONS DIVISION, POINT MUGU SIT£ 
-
FY-1993 STAllUZED RAT£S FOR DOD CUSTOMERS 
ACCL DIRECT PROO G&A TOTAL 
-TYPE CC i ORGANIZATION TITLE LABOR RATE RATE RATE RATE/HR 
GENOO COMMAND/STAFF OFFICE $46.39 $0.00 $27.00 ! $73.39 
GEN03 'DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR T&E I $42. f5 I $0.00 $27.00 I $69.15 
E/E04 SPECIAL PROJECTS $34.74 $2.77 $27.00 $64.51 I GENO& SERVICE AND INFO OIRECTORA TE $37.26 $0.00 $27.00 $64.26 GEN07 NAWS CO & STAFF $17.86 $0.00 $27.00 $44.66 
GENOA COMMAND STAFF ELEMENTS $48.39 $0.00 $27.00 $73.39 I 
RIT OB NAWCWPNS MRTFB MANGMT OFFICE $32.88 $0.00 $0.00 $32.88 
GENOC SOP/IG OFFICE $46.39 $0.00 $27.00 $73.39 
E/E 11 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT $42.70 $7.44 $27.00 $77.14 I E/E 15 RELIABILITY & INSTRUMENTATION DEPT $34.33 $18.28 $27.00 $79.81 E/E 18 STRIKE SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT $32.88 $16.14 $27.00 $75.82 
E/E 19 AIR INTERCEPT SYSTEMS DEPT $40.32 $11 .49 $27.00 $78.81 I 
EIE 20 IN-SERVICE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT $34.04 $15.52 $27.00 $76.56 
E/E 23 FIELD TECHNICAL REPS $31. 72 $8.97 $2.92 $41 .61 
RJT 34 SEA RANGE CUSTOMER OFFICE $45.49 $0.00 $0.00 $45.49 
RIT 35 RANGE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT $38.77 $0.00 $0.00 $38.77 
RIT 36 RANGE INSTRUMENTATION DEPT $36. 16 $0.00 $0.00 $36.16 
RJT 37 RANGE ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT $39.95 $0.00 $0.00 $39.95 
RJT 3B SEA RANGE DIRECTORATE $45.94 so.oo $0.00 $45.94 
E/E 3M MOBILE SEA RANGE DIVISION $33.24 $8.30 $27.00 $68.54 
RJT 3S RANGE SAFETY $44.21 $0.00 $0.00 $44.21 
E/E 40 ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEPARTMENT $34.97 $17.37 $27.00 $79.34 
E/E 52 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT DIVISION $35.05 $ 12.91 $27.00 $74.96 
E/E 53 TELEMETRY DIVISION $34.19 $18.28 $27.00 $79.47 
RIT 5A TARGETS $35.37 $0.00 $0.00 $35.37 
E/E SB TARGETS PROGRAM DIVISION $35.20 $15.19 $27.00 $77.39 
E/E SC FIELD SERVICE SECTION $33.32 $7.77 $2.92 $44.01 
GEN 61 COMPTROLLER DEPARTMENT $20.65 S0.00 $27.00 $47.85 
GEN82 HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT $26.11 $0.00 $27.00 $53. 11 
GEN 63 INFORMATION SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT t23.34 S0.00 $27.00 $50.34 
GEN64 TECHNICAL INFORMATION DEPARTMENT $30.29 $0.00 $27.00 $57.29 
GEN 85 PROCUREMENT DEPARTMENT $20.42 $0.00 $27.00 $47.42 
GEN 70 MORALE. WELFARE & RECREATION DEPT $19.61 $0.00 $27.00 $46.61 
GEN 72 SUPPLY DEPARTMENT $24.73 $0.00 $27.00 $51.73 
GEN 73 PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT $23.68 $0.00 $27.00 $50.68 
GEN 74 SECURITY DEPARTMENT $19.76 $0.00 $27.00 $46.76 
RJT 75 WEAPONS DEPARTMENT $27.54 $0.00 $0.00 $27.54 
RJT 76 AIR OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT $32.76 $0.00 $0.00 $32.76 
R/T 77 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT $27.13 so.oo $0.00 $27.13 
E/E 7A FLIGHT OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT $20.98 $11 .95 $27.00 $59.93 
R/T 7E 'EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVICES DEPT $26.82 $0.00 $0.00 $26.82 
E/E 7H FAMILY HOUSING DEPARTMENT $28. 16 $0.00 $27.00 $55.16 
GEN80 MARINE AVIATION DETACHMENT $20.32 $0.00 $27.00 $47.32 
E/E 90 AIRCRAFT WEAPONS INTEGRATION DEPT $35.86 $12.12 $27.00 $74.98 
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rate per year, instead of a production hourly rate per year, 
the actual total costs of that worker would not be recovered. 
This is why the acceleration rate is used. The problem is 
corrected by multiplying the acceleration rate by the total 
paid work hours, yielding a rate to fully cover the cost of 
that worker. The example below shows how an acceleration rate 
is determined for a worker with a $30,000 salary and fringe 
benefits costing $2,200. 
Cost of a worker without fringe benefits, leave, or holidays 
$30.000 annual salary = $14.42 cost per hr. 
2,080 hours paid per year 
Cost of that worker with fringe benefits, leave, and holidays 
2,080 hours paid per year 
~--=3=3=0 hours annual, sick, and holidays 
1,750 productive hours per year 
$30.000 salary+ $2,200 fringe= $18.29 cost per production hr. 
1,750 productive hours per year 
Determining what total acceleration rate needs to be 
applied to the cost per hour is computed by using the cost per 
production hour, minus the cost per hour paid, and dividing 
the result by the cost per hour paid. 
$18.29 - $14.42 
$14.42 
= 26.84% 
This example results in 26. 84%. This rate would always be 
used for that year to accelerate the cost per hour rate to 
calculate the total costs of that worker. The acceleration 
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rate as shown above, includes the costs for the fringe 
benefits and the adjustment for leave hours. 9 
The acceleration rates used by Pt. Mugu to determine the 
accelerated direct labor rate since FY-89 are shown in Table 
4. Obviously, acceleration is a major cost driver for direct 
labor rates. In FY-93 the rate was at 44t. The total cost of 
that labor hour is almost one and a half times the labor hour 
rate. Since FY-89 the acceleration rate has had an increase 
of lt or more every fiscal year. 
Table 4 
NAWC WEAPONS DIVISION, POINT MUGU 
FISCAL YEAR ACCELERATION RATES 
FY·93 FY·92 FY-91 FY-90 FY-89 
ANNUAL LEAVE 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 11.80% 9.80% 
SICK LEAVE 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 3.80% 
COMPENSATORY LEAVE 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 0.00% 0.00% 
HOLIDAY ANO OTHER 5.00% 5.00% 5.40% 4.90% 4.60% 
FICA TAX 3.10% 3.00% 2.50% 2.50% 1.40% 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT FUND 5.20% 5.00% 5.80% 5.80% 7. 70% 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEAL TH BENEFITS 8.30% 8.00% 8.00% 5.60% 3.40% 
MEDICARE 1.50% 1.50% 1.20% 1.20% 1.70% 
THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN 0.50% 0.50% 0.30% 0.80% 0.50% 
THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN MATCHING 1.10% 1.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM 5.90% 5.80% 5.10% 4.20% 5.00% 
YEARLY ACCELERATION RATE 44.00% 43.00% 42.00% 40.70% 31.00% 
P. ANNUAL PAY RAISES 
Annual pay raises are also a cost driver of the labor 
rate. Annual pay raise rates obtained from the Human 
9This discussion is derived in part from the format used in 
NPS Practical Comptrollership, 1993, pgs. E20-E22. 
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Resources Department (HRD) at Pt. Mugu are listed in Tables. 
A significant jump occurred in January 91 for a total pay 
increase of 11.6\. This is largely due to the Cost Of Living 
Allowance (COLA) given that year because of Pt. Mugu's high 
cost of living status. Pay raises, which all occur in 
January, are reflected in the DBOF labor rates for the fiscal 
year if the pay raise is requested in the President's budget. 
The COLA portion of the January 91 pay increase was not 
included in the FY-92 labor rates. This happened because it 
was an unexpected COLA and was not budgeted for the submission 
that year. The COLA was included in the FY-93 labor rates. 
Table 5 
NAWC PT. MUGU ANNUAL CIVILIAN PAY INCREASES 
I I 
EFFECTIVE DA TE Jan-93 Jan-92 Jan-911 Jan-90\ Jan-89 
YEARLY PAY RAISE 3.80% 4.10% 3.60%! 3.40%1 4.10% 
COST OF LIVING ALLOW. 8.00%1 8.00% 8.00%i l 
G. NET OPBRATING RBSlJLTS 
Basic standardized balance sheets are used at NAWCWPNs, 
Pt. Mugu for budget submissions. In accordance with the DBOF 
guidelines, the goal is to have a zero profit or loss at the 
end of a fiscal year. If there is a profit or loss, the 
resulting balance at the end of a fiscal year is called the 
Net Operating Results (NORs) . · The NOR equates to the 
difference between total revenues and total expenses of an 
activity for a current fiscal year. 
39 
Table 6 
NAVAL AIR WEAPONS CENTER. POINT MUGU 
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND COSTS 
1$0001 
·-FY-92 FY-93 I FY-94 i FY-95 
ASSETS 712,730 535,994 511.881 1 527.915 
! 
LIASILIT:ES 257.364 264.933 267.622 I 236,719 
I : EQUITY 455.366 271.061 244.259 291.196 
' 
LIABILITIES & EQUITY 712.730 535.994 l 511.881 I 527,915 
REVENUE 1,159.273 1.229.224 1.191.246: 1,224.048 
COST OF GOODS & SERVICES I 1.181.268 1,210,717 1,204.800 1,191.325 
REVENUE LESS EXPENSES I 121,9951 1e,501 I 113,5541 32.723 
AOR CALCULATIONS I 
NET OPERA TING RES UL TS 121.9951 18.507 113,5541 32,723 
PRIOR VEAR ADJUSTMENTS 114,8261 33.610 I 0 0 
TOTAL FY CHANGE AOR 136.8211 52.117 113,5541 32.723 
BEGINNING FY AOR I 134,4651 171.2861 119.1691 (32.7231 
ACCUM OPERATING RESULTS 171.2881 (19.1691i (32.72311 0 
The DBOF concept discussed in chapter IV includes the 
requirement for full recovery of costs. Some industrial 
activities, including NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu, have had big revenue 
losses in previous years. These losses are carried forward on 
the financial records as Accumulating Operating Results 
(AORs). AOR~ consist of the running totals of the previous 
fiscal years' NORs. 
In the old industrial fund, recovery of revenue losses 
were planned to be recouped over a relatively long period of 
time. Recently, under the DBO~, the recovery period of 
revenue was changed to set prices for full recovery of 
previous losses by the end of FY-94, later shifted again to 
the end of FY-95. Recovering all the prior years' losses in 
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one year for activities such as NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu would have 
dramatically increase their rates. If the rates go too high, 
a customer will have to choose between foregoing some service 
or getting help from a different activity, possibly at another 
base, to have the service performed. 
Table 6 summarizes the FY-92-95 execution budget for 
NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu. These figures will be used to analyze 
the effects the AOR has on the stabilized rates in FY-93 for 
Pt. Mugu. The first column for FY-92 shows the AOR at 
-$71,286,000. The NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu Comptroller's office 
personnel, when questioned about a plan for recovery of that 
loss, noted that the entire amount, realistically, could not 
have been recovered in FY-93. If they would have attempted to 
do this the AOR recoupment rate alone would have been $18.23 
per hour. The average FY-93 overall accelerated direct labor 
hour rate computed earlier was already $34.55. This would 
have brought the total labor rate to $52.78. With production 
and G&A costs included, the grand total would have come to 
$92.09 per hour. 
Because such a rate would be unaffordable, NAWCWPNs, Pt. 
Mugu set a goal to zero the AOR by the end of FY-95 as shown 
in Table 6. Direct labor rates were increased in FY-93 to 
start recovering the $71 million AOR deficit. The figures 
used to determine the FY-93 AOR recoupment rate are shown in 
Table 7. A calculated average rate of $3. 53 per hour was 
added to all direct labor tours in FY-93. Earlier in this 
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chapter (Section C, Stabilization Rates) the AMD' s FY-93 
estimated direct labor rate was calculated. The resulting 
figure was $23.75 per direct labor hour. This figure was only 
a calculation for the budget submission and could be modified 
in the process. Combining the estimated labor submission 
figure with the AOR figure will give approximately what should 
be charged for labor in FY-93. 
$23.75 (FY-93 estimated budget submission labor rate) 
+ S3.53 (AOR recoupment for FY-93) 
$27.28 {Estimated total labor late to expect from OSD) 
Table 7 
FY-93 ACCUMULATING OPERATING RESULTS RECOUPMENT 
I 
DIRECT ADDED/ CALCULATED 
i TOTAL LABOR EXCLUDED I NET AVERAGE 
i COSTS i HOURS HOURS HOURS RATE 
AOR 1 
' 
RECOUPMENT ! $13, 793,000 ! 3,921,328 I (10,230) 3,911,098 I $3.53 
The approved FY-93 stabilized direct labor rate for the 
AMD was actually $27.13, which included the AOR recoupment 
{see Table 3). It's still optimistic to expect full recovery 
of the AOR by FY-95. Unanticipated adjustments occur yearly 
for added and excluded labor hours, and rules change as to how 
charges or credits may be manipulated on the balance sheets. 
These kinds of problems have arisen frequently over the 
past few years at the NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu because it hasn't 
been operating in a 100% DBOF environment. NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu 
is in a state of flux. There seems to be discrepancies and 
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confusion as to what is included in the DBOF and what is not. 
There is no single expedient way of clearing up the questions. 
Balance sheet problems concerning the NORs and AORs will 
probably persist until there is a full transition into the 
DBOF. 
The NARs were affected greatly by the AOR recoupment 
charged in FY-93. The AORs recoupment was a major cost driver 
with a cost increase of $3.53 per hour. That, when added to 
the labor rate, equates to a 15% increase in the direct labor 
rate. 
B. MAJOR RANGB AND TBST PACILITY BABB 
NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu receives partial funding for some of 
its cost centers from the Major Range Test Facility Base 
(MRTFB) . This has a major impact on the DBOF charges from 
the AMO. The MRTFB is described in OPNAVINST 3900.25B: 
The MRTFB is a national asset which shall be sized, 
operated, and maintained primarily for DoD test and 
evaluation (T&E) support missions, but also be available 
to all users having a valid requirement for its 
capabilities. The MRTFB consists of a broad base of T&E 
activities managed and operated under uniform guidelines 
to provide T&E support to DoD Components responsible for 
developing or operating material and weapons systems. 
All DoD users of the MRTFB are required to pay for all 
direct costs associated with using the facilities, excluding 
military labor costs. What this means for the NAR squadrons 
is that any time they use the ranges at NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu 
they pay for all related direct costs. These costs come out 
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of their SAG CE funds. Funding for the MRTFB is further 
described in NAVAIRWARCENINST 7000.1: 
The MRTFB is funded under the Research, Development, Test 
and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation and is provided 
institutional funding on an annual basis to cover all 
overhead expenses associated with the maintenance and 
operations of the MRTFB cost centers. General purpose 
equipment and improvements and modernization of MRTFB are 
also institutionally funded. 
The NAVAIRWARCENINST 7000 .1 further states that the MRTFB 
covers only the ranges at NAWCWPN's, Pt. Mugu. This includes 
the maintenance and operations facilities at NAWCWPNs, Pt. 
Mugu that support the extensive ranges. 
include: 
• NAWCWPNs MRTFB Management Off ice 
• Sea Range Customer Off ice 
• Range Operations Department 
• Range Engineering Department 
• Sea Range Directorate 
• Range Safety 
• Targets 
• Weapons Department 
• Air Operations Department 
• Explosive Ordinance Devices Department 
• Aircraft Maintenance Department 
These facilities 
As shown above, the AMO is included in this funding. Any 
activity like the AMO that falls into the DBOF is prohibited 
from charging a customer for any of its costs which are funded 
or reimbursed from another source. 
The MRTFB funds cover all of the AMO production and G&A 
expenses which it would otherwise charge to its customers. 
What does this mean for the NAR squadrons? The cost data 
gathered from the AMO revealed that the rates charged to the 
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NARs, in fact, have only been for direct labor. This 
situation remained unchanged even after the AMD transferred to 
the DBOF. Without the MRTFB funds the NAR squadrons would 
have been charged their fair share of production and G&A costs 
as required by the DBOF. 
This also means that the assumption of COMNAVAIRESFOR as 
to why the DBOF costs were escalating was incorrect. The 
squadrons from the NAR probably have been getting a better 
deal than they originally thought. The NAR squadrons, for the 
most part, use the range facilities very little each year. It 
would seem that they should be paying for their appropriate 
share of production and G&A expenses for the maintenance 
periods not directly related to range use. These expenses 
would amount to adding the NAWCWPNs', Pt. Mugu standard G&A 
stabilized rate and the AMD' s production stabilized rate. 
Using the stabilized rates for FY-93 the total cost of 
indirect overhead would have been: 
G&A Stabilized Rate 
Production Stabilized Rate 




Total civilian labor hours of all AMD work centers 
Indirect stabilized rate (from above) 




That would have increased the NARs total charges for work 
performed by 124%. 
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I. MILITARY LABOR 
The AMD consists of both military and civilian personnel. 
The DBOF includes any military labor charges used in producing 
a product or perf arming services. The NAR squadrons have also 
been getting a break for the military labor used in repairing 
their equipment. This again is due to the AMD falling under 
the MRTFB. The military labor used for supporting facilities 
of the MRTFB falls under the MPN appropriation. 
Tables 8/9 reflect the military labor totals. Military 
labor also has developed stabilized rates for each year. They 
are divided into two rates, Officer and Enlisted. Using the 
military labor stabilized rates for FY-93 the total cost of 
military lobor would have been: 
Officer Stabilized Labor Rate 
Enlisted Stabilized Labor Rate 
$48.71 
$21.89 
The work centers involved consist of Enlisted only 
Total military labor hours of all AMD work centers 




The military labor costs would increase the NAR's labor 
bill by almost another 31t. This again goes back to the 
problem of everyone not being a member of the DBOF. If the 
MRTFB didn't include the AMD, military labor costs would have 
been charged to the NAR. This would have created a more 




NAVAL AIR RESERVE PT. MUGU LABOR INFORMATION 
FY·93 FY·92 _, ______ _ 
Mil CIV STAB NAR AMO AVER/RATE MIL CIV STAB NAR AMO I AVER/RATE 
--------- --·-------------·- --·- ---- --·-- ----- - ----~- - -------- ---
WC HOURS HOURS RATE COSTS COSTS PER HOUR HOURS HOURS RATE COSTS COSTS PER HOUR 
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--- --
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---- -------- ____ .. ----
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77A 0 0 t27.13 $0.00 $0 t0.00 0 2,472 t21.67 t53,568 
TOTAL 2,089 7,768 '27.13 t210,745.84 








~P·86 _ _ ___ _ __ ___ ~i __ _ 
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- - - f--· --------- -- -------· -------
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-
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Mil CIV STAB 
HOURS HOURS RATE 
0 434 '21.98 
'241 112 $21.98 
2,141 399 $21.98 
410 71 $21.98 
286 1,217 t21.98 
0 1,128 $21.98 
3,078 3.361 $21.98 
0 405 921.98 
0 0 t21.98 
762 276 t21.98 
2.583 334 t21.98 
395 336 $21.98 
217 1,293 '21.98 
0 1,632 t21.98 
3,957 4,276 $21.98 
0 554 $21.98 
0 162 921.98 
1,404 461 t21.98 
6,311 2,352 t21.98 




0 1, 115 $21.98 
8,344 6,439 t21.98 
---- ··-
15,379 14,076 t21.98 ,......_ __ 
·--
29,455 
NAVAL AIR RESERVE PT. MUGU LABOR INFORMATION 
FY-91 
--
NAR AMO AVER/RATE MIL CIV 
-
>-
COSTS COSTS PER HOUR HOURS HOURS 
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$2,462 •2.137 $19.08 148 107 
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--
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te,429 t9,01J 921.01 1,236 645 
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t141,529 $144,155 t22.39 12,246 7.760 
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J. DBOP LABOR ANALYSIS 
Since it was determined we are only looking at direct 
labor rate cost increases concerning the NAR squadrons, 
further data was collected from the NAR, NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu's 
Comptroller and the AMO. The results are shown in Tables 8/9. 
The data for labor hours prior to FY-90 was incomplete and 
unreliable. Data for FY's 91-92 had some minor discrepancies; 
FY's 92-93 is considered accurate. The data will be analyzed 
from different points of interest. 
1. Maintenance Hours 
The most obvious reason for an increase in the NAR's 
costs is the increasing number of hours of total maintenance. 
For instance, one squadron, VP-65 had a major aircraft 
modification upgrading its aircraft to the P-3C update 2 in 
FY-90 through FY-91. The other squadrons have also 
experienced consistently more maintenance work performed as 
reflected in the total combined hours from FY-91 to the 
present. The AMD suggested part of that increase resulted 
from its increased training for proper job order documentation 
in the work center. Previous AMD administrative inspections 
purportedly showed that some of the work centers were not 
documenting the proper accounts for work performed on the 
NAR' s equipment. There was no corroborative evidence of AMO' s 
assertion. How much of an increase that has resulted is only 
a guess. 
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A major cause of the increasing labor costs can be 
attributed to the declining "free" military labor. The AMD 
military onboard numbers have dramatically declined since FY-
90. The Enlisted numbers, in particular, are important to 
consider for the NARs cost figures. All of the military labor 
performed in the AMD work centers for the NAR are Enlisted 
labor hours. The AMD was manned in the fourth quarter FY-93 
with the military personnel numbers in Table 10. 
Table 10 
TOTAL OFFICERS ENLISTED 
BILLET ONBOARD BILLET ONBOARD BILLET ONBOARD 
346 267 13 12 333 255 
Enlisted manning is presently at only 77%. In FY-92 
the manning was down to almost 60%. The bottom of Tables 8/9 
show the FY total military and civilian labor hours. The 
ratio of labor hours between the two groups has been shifting. 
The total number of military labor hours were at their 
greatest in FY-90 and have been declining ever since. The 
opposite holds true for the civilian labor hours. Since the 
labor time each year has been shifting more to the civilian 
work force, the NAR has been paying for increased hours. That 
would quickly escalate the cost to the NAR for services even 
if the amount of total labor hours did not increase each year. 
These figures are summarized in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
FY-93 FY-92 FY-91 FY-90 
8,879 12,882 MIL 15,379 MIL 24,462 MIL 
MIL HRS HRS HRS HRS 
23,132 CIV 17,712 CIV 14,076 CIV 16,057 CIV 
HRS HRS HRS HRS 
27.7% 42.1% 52.2% 60.4% 
MIL/CIV MIL/CIV MIL/CIV MIL/CIV 
While the NAR was getting a good deal for not having 
to pay for military labor in the past, this has changed with 
the shifting labor ratios. That shift is now the greatest 
cost driver for the NAR. Table 12 shows the effect of the 
shifting labor ratios on the NAR's costs. The top half of 
Table 12 starts with the FY-90 civilian to military labor 
hours ratio at the AMD. At that time 39.63% of all labor 
hours were performed by civilian labor. If that percentage 
had remained constant every year through FY-93, what would the 
cost variance have been? The chart assumes the amount of 
actual historic FY total labor hours would have remained the 
same each year whether performed by civilian or military 
labor. The new "total civilian hours to bill" is the result 
of taking 39.63% (FY-90 civilian ratio) of the "total hours." 
Applying the "stabilization rates" to the "total civilian 
hours to bill" determines what the "NAR would have paid." 
Savings is the resulting difference from what the "NAR 
actually paid." If the civilian labor ratio had stayed 
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constant at the FY-90 ratio of 39.63% the NAR would not have 
had an 82.34% increase in its bill over the four year period. 
Table 12 
NAWC WPNs SHIFTING MILITARY TO CIVILIAN LABOR 
I I I 
FY-90 RA TIO USED AS CONSTANT BASE YEAR 
FY-93 FY-92 FY-91 FY-90 
MILITARY HOURS 8,879 12,882 15,379 24,462 
CIVILIAN HOURS 23, 132 17,712 14,076 16.057 
TOTAL HOURS I 32,011 I 30,594! 29,4551 40,519 
FY-90 CIV RA TIO 39.63%! 39.63%l 39.63% 39.63% 
TOT AL CIV HRS TO BILL 12,686 12,1241 11,673 16,057 
STABILIZATION RA TE $27.13 $21.67 $21.98 $20.18 
NAR WOULD HAVE PAID $344, 170 $262,736 $256,573 $324,030 
NAA ACTUALLY PAID $627,571 $383,819 $309,390 $324,030 
SAVINGS $283,401 . $121,083 $52,817 $0 
% INCREASE IN BILL 82.34% 46.09% 20.59~ 0.00% 
COST INCREASE FROM RA TIO CHANGE EACH FY 
MILITARY HOURS 8,879 12,882 15,~79 24,462 
CIVILIAN HOURS 23, 132 17,712 14,076 16,057 
TOTAL HOURS 32,011 30,594 29,455 40,519 
CURRENT FY CIV RA TIO 72.26% 57.89% 47.79% 39.63% 
% RA TIO CHANGE BETWEEN FY 14.37% 10.11 % 8.16% 0 
FY CIV HRS INCREASE DUE TO RA TIO 4,600 3,092 2,403 0 
STABILIZATION RATE $27.13 $21.67 $21.98 $20.18 
FY COST INCR. FROM RATIO CHANGE $124,788 $66,997 $52,828 0 
NAR ACTUALLY PAID $627,571 $383,819 $309,390 $324,030 
NAR WOULD HAVE PAID $502,783 $316,822 $256,562 $324,030 
% INCREASE IN BILL 24.82% 21.15% 20.59% 0.00% 
The bottom of Table 12 reflects the yearly percent 
increase in the costs of the NAR resulting from the change of 
the ratios between each FY. It breaks out more clearly what 
is happening to the cost of the NARs each year due to 
decreasing military labor hours and increasing civilian labor 
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hours. For FY-93 almost 25\ of the increase in cost can be 
attributed to this labor shift. 
2. Labor Coat Variances 
The total costs of labor the NARs are charged and the 
actual costs of labor for the AMD results in different degrees 
of variance. Using FY-93 figures summarized in Table 13 as an 
example, the NAR's costs were $627,571 and the AMD's costs 
were $570,820. This means the reserves actually paid $56,751 
more than the actual labor costs in the respective shops. 
This FY, in particular, has had a large variance because of 
the AOR recoupment being included in the labor rate. By 
removing the $3.53 recoupment from the labor stabilized rate 
of $27.13, the stabilized rate for labor is actually $23.60. 
The AMD FY-93's labor rate averaged $24.68 (only the shops 
doing the NARs maintenance). The variance of $1.08 per hour 
is a result of the stabilized labor rate being used as the 
basis to charge the NARs. 
Table 13 
THE AMD LABOR COST VERSUS THE NAR COST 
CIV STAB NAR AMO AMO AVG CHARGE 
FY HOURS RATE COSTS COSTS HR RATE VARIANCE 
93 23, 132 $27.13 $627,571 $570,820 $24.68 $56,751 
92 17,712 $21.67 $383,819 $420.264 $23.73 ($36,445) 
91 14,076 $21.98 $309,390 $309,553 $21.99 1$1631 
90 16,057 $20.18 $324,030 $316,882 $19.73 $7, 148 
The AMD labor stabilization rate ($23.60 with 
recoupment removed) is based on an average of all the work 
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centers' production labor rates. lO The work centers where 
the NAR' s work was performed makes up only a part of AMO. 
Thus, the salaries of the work centers completing the work for 
the NAR average more than the average of the whole AMO in FY-
93. 
Some years the NAR pays more than the AMD costs and 
some years the NAR pays less. This variance is hard to avoid 
with the estimated budget figures developed so far in advance. 
Factors such as pay increases, promotions, labor turnover 
etc., all have to be accurate for the stabilized rate and the 
real labor costs at the AMO to match. 
lt. SlJMMAR.Y OP COST DRIVERS 
This chapter has looked at how different cost drivers 
affecting the NAR were determined. The major factors recapped 
are: 
• Labor acceleration 
• Annual pay raises 
• AORs recoupment 
• Changing ratio between total military labor hours and 
civilian labor hours each year 
• Increase in total maintenance hours each year 
10oiscussed earlier in the chapter under Section D. 
STABILIZATION RATES. 
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Also shown was the areas where military and civilian labor 
are charged, and that indirect costs are not charged to the 
NAR. Organizing and combining the pertinent data discussed 
earlier can be seen in Table 14. Although previously 
determined cost increases do not match up exactly to the 
actual total cost increases to the NARs, they follow close 
enough to see what the greatest cost drivers are to the NAR. 
Table 14 
SUMMARY OF NAR COST DRIVERS 
FY-93 FY·92 FY-91 FY-90 
ACCELERATION 1.00% 1.00% 1.30% 2.70% 
PAY RAISES 12.10% 3.60% 3.40% 4.10% 
AOR RECOUPMENT 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CIV HOURS RATIO 24.82%i 21.15% 20.59% 0.00% 
INCREASE TOT AL HR 4.60% 3.90% -27.31 % 0.00% 
TOTAL 57.52% 29.65% -2.02% 6.80% 
ACTUAL INCREASE 63.51% 24.06% -4.52% 
The most surprising cost driver from the analysis was the 
changing ratio between the military and civilian labor hours. 
This ends up being the biggest cost driver and the one 
overlooked by everybody. Figure 4 graphs the results and 
distinguishes the cost drivers. Second to the changing labor 
ratios is the AOR recoupment in FY-93. That cost, combined 
with the annual pay increase of 12%, played a large part in 
the big overall cost totals in FY.: 9 3 . 11 
11Includes COLA. 
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The main causes for the NAR's present cost increases have 
been highlighted in this chapter. Caution and planning should 
be taken for possible large future cost growth to the NARs. 
That could result from further incorporation of the DBOF at 
the NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although there is a major funding shortage from the NAR 
Pt. Mugu view, the funding gap from the COMNAVAIRESFOR point 
of view is still small compared to their other budget 
concerns. The COMNAVAIRESFOR overall O&M,NR budget for FY-93 
totaled $276 million (see Figure 5). The FY-93 DBOF charges 
equaled approximately . 002t of their total budget. Other 
COMNAVAIRESFOR program problems affect a much larger share of 
Pigure 5 









the budget. For this reason the funding shortage at Pt. Mugu 
will probably continue unless this problem moves up on the 
priority list. 
The majority of the rising costs of the NAR results 
directly from conflicts of working in two different funding 
systems. The number one cost driver of shifting labor time 
hour ratios would not be as great a problem if the AMD had all 
its military billets manned. The NAR probably would now be 
paying for military labor if it weren't for the MRTFB 
including the AMD. The question still remains if the NAR 
should be paying the indirect costs at the AMD for their 
squadrons' maintenance not related to the range use. This 
amounts to almost all of their maintenance hours. If they 
were charged for G&A and production expenses, it would almost 
double their present costs. 
From the NAR viewpoint, all of the DBOF charges seem 
unfair since they are not funded for them properly. This 
again goes back to the basic problem of dealing within two 
different funding and cost systems. Since the NAR squadrons 
are a tenant at the NAWCWPNs, Pt. Mugu, they have little 
choice but to go along with the DBOF charges. 
The NAR needs to incorporate the cost drivers discussed 
herein into their budget estimates to improve their situation 
in the future. The big problem for the NAR has been that 
budget estimates made in the past for the present come up 
short because of the unanticipated changing labor ratios. 
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This problem shouldn't be as big a factor in the future with 
the onboard numbers of the military presently increasing at 
the AMD. Until the budget process catches up with more 
accurate estimates of the actual costs, COMNAVAIRESFOR will 
have to keep helping the NAR at Pt. Mugu by shifting money 
from other programs. 
59 
LIST OP RBPBRBHCBS 
Baumol, W. and Blinder, A., Economics Principles And Policy, 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanoviell, 1988. 
Buckley, J., Buckley, M. and Chiang, H., Research Methodology 
And Business Decisions, National Association of Accountants, 
1976. 
COMNAVRESFOR P7100. lA. Subject: Budget and Financial Guidance 
Manual. 
Deakin, E. and Ma.her, M., Cost Accounting, Irwin, 1991. 
Defense Business Operations fund Cor;porate Qyeryiew and 
Operating Budgets, DoD, 1993. 
Defense Business Operations Fµnd Executive Summary, DoD, 1993. 
Defense Business Operations Fµnd Implementation Plan, DoD, 
1993. 
Financial Ma.nagement Ma.nual, DoD, 1993. 
Hitch, c. and McKean, R., The Economics Of Defense In The 
Nuclear Age, Harvard Business Press, 1973. 
NAVAIRWARCENINST 7000.1. 
Facility Base. 
Subject: Ma.jor Range and Test 
OPNAVINST 3900.2SB. Subject: Ma.jor Range and Test Facility 
~-
Pindyck, R. and Rubinfeld, D., Microeconomics, Macmillan, 
1992. 
Practical Comptrollership, Naval Postgraduate School, February 
1993. 
Principal Deputy Comptroller for the Department of Def !nse 
(DOD) (C)) (Honorable D.B. Shycoff), Memorandum of 15 October 
1990, Subj: UNIT COST RESOURCING GUIDANCE. 
Rayburn, G., Cost Accounting Using A Cost Management Approach, 
Irwin, 1993. 
60 
Seiden, N.E., The DOD Unit Cost Initiative: A Nayy Overview. 
Economic Analysis. And Review Of Base Operations Support Cost 
Allocation, Master's Thesis, NPGS, Monterey, Ca, December 
1991. 
Stinnet M., "The A-B-Cs of PPBS," The Greener Side of Air 
Force Blue, Vol 5, Air Command and Staff College, 1986. 
61 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria VA 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 052 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5002 
3. Commander Naval Air Reserve Force 
4400 Dauphine Street 
New Orleans LA 70146-5000 
Attn: LCDR Mike Downs, Code 519 
4. Naval Reserve Personnel Center 
4400 Dauphine Street 
New Orleans LA 70149-7800 






5. RADM Richard D. Milligan, USN (Retired), Code AS/Ml 1 
Department of Administrative Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5002 
6. Professor Gregory G. Hildebrandt, Code AS/Hi 
Department of Administrative Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey CA 93943-5002 
62 
1 
